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PLAYING BY THE RULE: HOW ABA MODEL
RULE 8.4(G) CAN REGULATE JURY EXCLUSION
Anna Offit*
Discrimination during voir dire remains a critical impediment to
empaneling juries that reflect the diversity of the United States. While
various solutions have been proposed, scholars have largely overlooked
ethics rules as an instrument for preventing discriminatory behavior during
jury selection. Focusing on American Bar Association Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(g), which regulates professional misconduct, this
Article argues that ethics rules may, under certain conditions, deter the
exclusionary practices of legal actors. Part I examines the specific history,
evolution, and application of revised Model Rule 8.4(g). Part II delves into
the ways that ethics rules in general, despite their limited use, can spur legal
and cultural change. Focusing on jury exclusion, Part III shows how Model
Rule 8.4(g) in particular might be applied to more effectively challenge and
sanction instances of race- and sex-based discrimination during voir dire. In
so doing, this Article reaffirms the productive role that ethics rules can play
in preventing forms of misconduct that undermine confidence in the
American jury and justice system.
INTRODUCTION
Renewed attention to racism and sexual harassment in American society
has helped to amplify concerns about the ongoing problems of race- and sexbased discrimination in the U.S. legal system. The legal profession in
particular has become a focus of criticism. For example, the media has put a
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spotlight on state bar association surveys1 that expose chronic workplace
mistreatment and federal lawsuits that reveal the disparate treatment of
female employees.2 Not long before #MeToo initiated a national
conversation about sexual assault, the American Bar Association (ABA)
sought to address the problems of harassment and discrimination with a
revision to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g). Notably, the
amended rule included a newly formulated subsection (g), which defined
professional misconduct as: “conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the
practice of law.”3
The most explicit qualification to Model Rule 8.4, aside from an
ambiguous carve-out for “legitimate advocacy”4 discussed in Part III,
appears in one of the rule’s comments. Revised Comment 5 to Model Rule
8.4(g) notes that in the context of jury selection proceedings, “a trial judge’s
finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis
does not alone establish a violation of paragraph (g).”5 This Article considers
the implications of the revised rule, and Comment 5 in particular, for the
pervasive problem of race- and sex-based exclusion in the American jury
system. First, as written, the comment leaves open the possibility that
lawyers and judges who violate antidiscrimination law during the jury
selection process can face sanctions. The possibility of punishment for
discriminatory behavior, paired with the rule’s inclusion of an objective mens
rea standard, thus has the potential to enhance the antidiscrimination
protections currently in place to promote representative juries.6
Part I provides a brief overview of the history and adoption of Model Rule
8.4(g) since its 2016 revision. Part II examines how ethics rules influence
attorney behavior even in cases that do not result in adjudicated violations or
1. See, e.g., Robert J. Derocher, As Women Lawyers Across the Country Say #MeToo,
Bar Associations Play an Important Role, BAR LEADER (Sept./Oct. 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/2018_19/septemb
er-october/as-women-lawyers-across-the-country-say-metoo-bar-associations-play-animportant-role [https://perma.cc/F734-HMX3] (citing survey results and feedback from
Massachusetts, South Dakota, Florida, and Iowa, each addressing experiences of gender and
sexual harassment, misconduct, and discrimination in the legal profession).
2. Tiffany Hsu, Jones Day Law Firm Is Sued for Pregnancy and Gender Discrimination
by 6 Women, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/business/
jones-day-pregnancy-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/M8L4-9TLH] (explaining that
Jones Day, one of the largest firms in the country, is accused of providing the best
opportunities and highest salaries to their male employees—“even when their legal skills are
notably deficient”—and penalizing female employees, particularly when they took maternity
leave, or had children).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
4. Id. (“This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or
withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not
preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.”).
5. Id. cmt. 5.
6. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (prohibiting race-based
discrimination during jury selection).
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sanctions. Turning to the illustrative context of jury exclusion, Part III argues
that notwithstanding Model Rule 8.4’s merely theoretical application to voir
dire to date, it should be viewed as an additional resource for practitioners,
jury reform advocates, and even prospective jurors who seek redress for
exclusionary practices that strip the jury system of its democratic and
inclusive character.
I. THE HISTORY AND ADOPTION OF REVISED MODEL RULE 8.4(G)
In 2008, the ABA added the elimination of bias and enhancement of
diversity within the legal profession as critical ethical aspirations.7 In this
spirit, the ABA amended Model Rule 8.4 as part of an affirmative effort to
better regulate attorney misconduct.8 The amendment process resulted in a
new subsection (g),9 created to deter discriminatory and harassing behavior
that was expressly “related to the practice of law.”10 Among the innovations
of the revision is a mens rea requirement that encompasses even unknowing
conduct, including that of attorneys who reasonably should know they are
engaged in misconduct.11 The new Model Rule 8.4(g) also features an
expanded list of protected groups, including those who face discrimination
on the basis of ethnicity, gender identity, and marital status.12 Yet, Comment
5 delineates one specific example of conduct that does not, in and of itself,
constitute impermissible discrimination: an adjudicated violation of Batson
v. Kentucky13 during jury selection.14 The comment notes, in effect, that a
7. AM. BAR ASS’N, REVISED RESOLUTION 109 AND REPORT 1 (2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/fin
al_revised_resolution_and_report_109.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU5L-DPHH].
8. Id. The 2007 amendment to the judicial code of conduct included the adoption of
Model Rule 2.3: “Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment.” Id. The goal of this amendment is to
provide a comparable provision for lawyer professional conduct. See id.
9. Kristine A. Kubes et al., The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4(g): Working to Eliminate
Bias, Discrimination, and Harassment in the Practice of Law, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 12,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_
construction/2019/spring/model-rule-8-4 [https://perma.cc/P2RG-QZLY]. The amendment
added subsection (g) but maintained the previously adopted subsections (a) to (f).
10. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g). In full, Model Rule 8.4(g) states that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
[E]ngage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment
or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic
status in conduct related to the practice of law. This paragraph does not limit the
ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in
accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or
advocacy consistent with these Rules.
Id.
11. The knowledge component requires that lawyers “know or reasonably should know”
that their conduct is harassment or discrimination. Id. “Know,” “reasonably,” and “reasonably
should know” are defined in Model Rule 1.0(f), (h), and (j), respectively. Additionally, the
amended rule does not force a lawyer to comply with the 8.4(g) restrictions as long as the
lawyer has a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. See id.
12. Id.
13. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
14. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5.
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peremptory challenge exercised in a discriminatory manner will not be
enough, on its own, to constitute misconduct under Model Rule 8.4.15
As I show in the sections that follow, reception to and adoption of Model
Rule 8.4(g) and other antidiscrimination rules has been gradual, even as
attention to systemic racism and bias in the legal profession has increased.
A. States Adopting Model Rule 8.4(g) in Its Entirety
After its passage by the ABA, two states and three U.S. territories adopted
Model Rule 8.4(g) in its entirety. This included Maine16 and Vermont, which
adopted it to add greater detail to their extant misconduct rules,17 along with
the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana
Islands.18 There has been one documented violation of Model Rule 8.4(g) in
Vermont since its adoption.19
B. States with Other Rules or Comments Addressing Discrimination and/or
Harassment
At present, twenty-nine states have adopted rules that explicitly prohibit
discrimination. Thirty-three states have similar rules and/or comments to
Model Rule 8.4 that prohibit discrimination and/or harassment by lawyers.20
California, for example, has a distinct rule addressing conduct that constitutes
prohibited discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.21 Some of these states
have removed a requirement of knowledge on the part of the offending

15. See id. The comment additionally specifies that attorneys are able to limit the scope
and subject matter of their practices without violating the rule, provided such limitations meet
the requirements of other Model Rules, including 1.5(a), 6.2, and 1.2(b). See id.
16. See ME. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4. While Maine adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), the
language is not an exact match to the ABA language and does not bar discrimination on the
basis of marital status or socioeconomic status. See id.
17. VT. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
18. See AM. SAM. HIGH CT. R. 104; N. MAR. I. ATT’Y DISCIPLINE & PROC. RESP. R. 3(1);
V.I. SUP. CT. R. 303(a).
19. See In re Robinson, 209 A.3d 570 (Vt. 2019).
20. Not including Vermont, as it was discussed in the “full adoption” paragraph. The
rules of the thirty-two states include: ARIZ. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; ARK. PRO. CONDUCT R.
8.4; CAL. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; COLO. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; CONN. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4;
DEL. LAWS.’ PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; FLA. BAR R. 4-8.4; IDAHO PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; ILL. PRO.
CONDUCT R. 8.4; IND. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; IOWA PRO. CONDUCT R. 32:8.4; ME. PRO.
CONDUCT R. 8.4; MD. ATT’YS PRO. CONDUCT R. 19-308.4; MINN. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; MO.
SUP. CT. R. 4-4.8; NEB. SUP. CT. R. § 3-508.4; N.H. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; N.J. PRO. CONDUCT
R. 8.4; N.M. PRO. CONDUCT R. 16-804; N.Y. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; N.C. PRO. CONDUCT R.
8.4; N.D. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; OHIO PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; OR. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; R.I.
PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; S.C. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; TENN. SUP. CT. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; TEX.
DISCIPLINARY PRO. CONDUCT R. 5.08; UTAH PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; WASH. STATE CT. PRO.
CONDUCT R. 8.4; W. VA. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; WIS. ATT’YS PRO. CONDUCT R. 20:8.4; WYO.
ATT’YS AT L. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4. Texas’s rule is under “Law Firms and Associations,
Prohibited Discriminatory Activities,” not in the 8.4 misconduct section of the rules, but it
does address discriminatory behavior. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY PRO. CONDUCT R. 5.08.
21. CAL. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4.1.
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lawyer, in place of “intent.”22 Indiana’s rule is further distinguished by its
reliance on actual conduct, manifested through words or actions, while
omitting a requirement that the offending party act with intent.23
Of the thirty-three states with rules or comments similar in substance to
Model Rule 8.4, twenty-two require that the misconduct be carried out
“knowing[ly].”24 Seventeen of those states have adopted Comment 3 to
Model Rule 8.4, which includes a knowing standard for engaging in conduct
that manifests bias or prejudice toward others.25 Three states require that the
lawyer who engages in discriminatory conduct intends to do so or that the
conduct is intended or likely to cause harm.26 The remaining seven states do
not have rules that include a requirement of knowledge or intent with respect
to alleged attorney bias, discrimination, or harassment.27

22. COLO. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4. In Colorado, the rule is dependent on the actual conduct
and the intent of the attorney:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . engage in conduct, in the
representation of a client, that exhibits or is intended to appeal to or engender bias
against a person on account of that person’s race, gender, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, whether that conduct is
directed to other counsel, court personnel, witnesses, parties, judges, judicial
officers, or any persons involved in the legal process.
Id.
23. IND. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4 (prohibiting lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct, in a
professional capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race,
gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, or
similar factors. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate this
subsection. A trial judge’s finding that preemptory challenges were exercised on a
discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule”).
24. These states include: Arizona (comment), Colorado (comment), Connecticut
(comment), Delaware (comment), Florida (rule—also a “callous indifference” standard used),
Idaho (comment), Illinois (rule and comment), Iowa (including, in a rule and in the comment,
a knowing standard for allowing staff in an attorney’s control to engage in such conduct),
Maine (rule and comment), Maryland (rule), Nebraska (comment), New Hampshire
(comment), New Mexico (comment), North Dakota (rule and comment), Oregon (rule), Rhode
Island (comment), South Carolina (comment), Tennessee (comment), Utah (comment), West
Virginia (comment), Wisconsin (comment), and Wyoming (comment). Vermont is not on the
list but does have a knowing standard, as it adopted Model Rule 8.4 in its entirety. See VT.
PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
25. COLO. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; DEL. LAWS.’ PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; IDAHO PRO.
CONDUCT R. 8.4; ILL. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; IOWA PRO. CONDUCT R. 32:8.4; NEB. SUP. CT. R.
§ 3-508.4; N.H. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; N.M. PRO. CONDUCT R. 16-804; N.D. PRO. CONDUCT
R. 8.4; R.I. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; S.C. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; TENN. SUP. CT. PRO. CONDUCT
R. 8.4; UTAH PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; VT. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; W. VA. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4;
WIS. ATT’YS PRO. CONDUCT R. 20:8.4; WYO. ATT’YS AT L. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4.
26. COLO. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; N.J. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; N.C. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4.
27. These states’ rules include: ARK. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; CAL. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4
cmt. 3; IND. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; MINN. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; N.Y. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4;
OHIO PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4; WASH. STATE CT. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4.
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C. States That Have (So Far) Declined to Adopt the Amended Rule
Several states have declined to adopt the amended rule altogether.
Montana,28 Texas,29 and Louisiana30 have chosen not to do so, for example,
citing First Amendment concerns. In contrast to most states that have rules
or language that address discriminatory conduct, Rule 5.08 of Texas’s
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“Prohibited Discriminatory
Activities”), which regulates willful expressions of bias or prejudice in
connection with legal proceedings, can be found under “Section V: Law
Firms and Associations.”31 More often, these types of rules are found in
“Section VIII: Maintaining the Integrity of the Legal Profession.”32 It is
even more common for rules prohibiting discriminatory conduct to be found
under states’ “misconduct” rules (often, Model Rule 8.4). Two states, South
Carolina33 and Tennessee,34 have declined to adopt Model Rule 8.4(g),
though both have rules (or comments) that explicitly address discrimination.

28. In Montana, the legislature’s joint resolution accused the rule of “seek[ing] to destroy
the bedrock foundations and traditions of American independent thought, speech, and action.”
S.J. Res. 15, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017).
29. In Texas, the legislature cited similar concerns about speech protected by the First
Amendment, stating that the rule would “severely restrict attorneys’ ability to engage in a
meaningful debate on a range of important social and political issues.” Tex. Op. Att’y Gen.
No. KP-0123 (Dec. 20, 2016), 2016 WL 7433186.
30. In Louisiana, the legislature found the phrase “conduct related to the practice of law”
to be overbroad and chilling to a substantial amount of speech that is constitutionally
protected.” LSBA Rules Committee Votes Not to Proceed Further with Subcommittee
Recommendations Re: ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), LA. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.lsba.org/
NewsArticle.aspx?Article=c959815a-a774-441e-b411-92fe9a2dbb16
[https://perma.cc/
AVU2-YBPK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
31. TEX. DISCIPLINARY PRO. CONDUCT R. 5.08.
32. Id. r. 8.04.
33. S.C. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 3. The South Carolina rule regarding attorney
misconduct addresses manifestation of attorney bias or prejudice in Comment 3 to the rule:
A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words
or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (e)
when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate
advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (e). A trial
judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis
does not alone establish a violation of this rule.
Id.
34. TENN. SUP. CT. PRO. CONDUCT R. 3.8. In Tennessee, the only area where the rules
address discrimination is in the comments to Rule 3.8 (“Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor”). Id. r. 8.4. Tennessee included Comment 3 in its misconduct rule, which
addresses attorney bias or prejudice in the course of representing a client:
A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests, by words
or conduct, bias or prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability,
age, sexual orientation, or socio-economic status violates paragraph (d) when such
actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy
respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d).
Id.
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D. States That Do Not Regulate Attorney Discrimination and/or
Harassment
Fifteen states and two territories do not have ethics rules that address
discrimination, harassment, or bias.35 In addition, three states have omitted
Comment 3 from their versions of Model Rule 8.4 that speak directly to
prohibiting discriminatory conduct.36 Oklahoma and Virginia, for example,
removed Comment 3 from their Model Rule 8.4 equivalent, with Virginia
noting, in its place: “ABA Model Rule Comment not adopted.”37
II. DETERRING MISCONDUCT THROUGH ETHICS RULES
In the United States, the legal profession is regulated by both formal rules
and informal norms.38 The model ethics rules, including Model Rule 8.4(g),
can thus be viewed as part of an effort to reflect and reinforce normative
commitments to valued antidiscrimination principles. In this respect, and
even apart from their regulatory function and the potential sanctions that flow
from their violation, such rules are central to the working life of an attorney.
They not only determine eligibility to practice but also help shape a lawyer’s
perception of her identity as a professional.39 Formal legal ethics rules have
largely developed within the self-regulating regime of the profession, where
the legal community is afforded substantial autonomy to regulate itself.40
The federal courts have independent authority to adopt rules of practice and
to discipline attorneys, though most follow the ethics rules of the state in
which the court sits.41 In almost all jurisdictions, once state supreme courts
have adopted model rules, they carry the force of law.42 Though few
enforceable legal sanctions for unethical behavior existed before the
promulgation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,43 courts and

35. See ALA. PRO. CONDUCT R.; ALASKA PRO. CONDUCT R.; D.C. PRO. CONDUCT R.; GA.
PRO. CONDUCT R.; GUAM PRO. CONDUCT R; HAW. PRO. CONDUCT R.; KAN. PRO. CONDUCT R.;
KY. SUP. CT. PRO. CONDUCT R.; LA. PRO. CONDUCT R.; MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. PRO. CONDUCT
R.; MICH. PRO. CONDUCT R.; MISS. PRO. CONDUCT R.; MONT. PRO. CONDUCT R.; NEV. PRO.
CONDUCT R.; OKLA STAT. tit. 5, app. 3-A (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-18-app. (2020);
VA. PRO. CONDUCT R.
36. Massachusetts has reserved Comment 3 to Rule 8.4 for future modification. MASS.
SUP. JUD. CT. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4.
37. OKLA STAT. tit. 5, app. 3-A; VA. PRO. CONDUCT R.
38. DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATION 8 (2d ed. 2006).
39. Id. at 4.
40. GREGORY C. SISK ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 111 (2018) (noting that the legal profession has developed in this manner
as part of a social compact to “restrain self-interest, to promote ideals of public service, and
to maintain high standards of performance”).
41. Id. at 115; see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial
Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 75–76 (2009).
42. Id. at 113.
43. W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without the Code, the Rules, or the
Restatement: Or, What Do Honor and Shame Have to Do with Civil Discovery Practice, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1567, 1567 (2003).
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regulatory authorities now enforce a complex body of law that governs
lawyers’ everyday work.44
A common critique of the ethics rules that regulate the legal profession is
their underenforcement.45 Still, the rules can promote lawyers’ regulation of
their own and others’ behavior by articulating shared values and professional
norms. One impetus for lawyers’ self-regulation is their expectation that
reputational damage and the possibility of sanction might result from
violations of the rules. To grasp the deterrent potential of formal ethics rules,
it is necessary to focus on how the rules affect lawyers’ understandings of
the possible or probable consequences of taking certain actions and failing to
take others.
A. Professional Self-Regulation
Ethics rules promote self-regulation by modifying the personal and
professional outcomes associated with compliance and infraction. In rare
cases, compliance with ethics rules can lead to the enhancement of one’s
professional reputation—marked by awards that celebrate the ethical
performance of one’s duties—“fairness,” “integrity,” “professionalism,”
“public trust,” and a “commitment to justice.”46 Formal and informal
recognition may even be accompanied by public social gatherings that both
“signal” ethical aptitude and offer credentials that can be commoditized or
otherwise integrated into law firms’ presentations of their employees.47

44. Id.
45. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal
Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 971 (2002).
46. This sort of biographical text can be found in descriptions of the winners of the
Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys’ Advisory Council “Lifetime Achievement Awards.” Lifetime
Achievement Awards, APAAC, https://www.apaac.az.gov/awards/lifetime-achievementawards [https://perma.cc/6W64-FR56] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021); see also Criminal Justice
Section Awards, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://nysba.org/awards-competitions/criminaljustice-section-awards [https://perma.cc/Y6Y7-4PD5] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (discussing
that these awards are given to an “Outstanding Prosecutor,” whose “professional conduct
evidences a true understanding of a public prosecutor’s duty to advance the fair and ethical
administration of criminal justice”). There is also peer-review-based ethical recognition for
professional conduct. See, e.g., Martindale-Hubbell Attorney Peer Ratings and Client
Reviews, MARTINDALE, https://www.martindale.com/ratings-and-reviews [https://perma.cc/
9XYU-EYQA] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (“A second rating was also given to go along with
the [legal ability] rating and that was a ‘V,’ meaning that the attorney’s peers stated they had
‘Very High’ ethical standards. Over the years this transitioned to ‘AV’, ‘BV’, and ‘CV’
ratings—with an ‘AV’ rating meaning that the attorney had reached the highest of professional
excellence and is recognized for the highest levels of skill and integrity.”).
47. William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism Without Monopoly, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 639, 652 (2003); see also Milton C. Regan Jr., Professional Reputation:
Looking for the Good Lawyer, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 549, 554–57 (1998) (discussing the various
contexts in which a lawyer’s professional reputation is relevant, including “for reasons ranging
from personal identity, to the ease of conducting negotiation or litigation, to the possibility of
obtaining referrals”); Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 176 (2008) (“Because of the importance of lawyers’ reputations in
the minds of prospective clients, lawyers’ desires to maintain specific types of reputation have
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Beyond the possibility of public recognition, however, ethics rules can also
encourage lawyers to consider whether their decisions reflect praiseworthy
conduct in their profession.48 The jury selection process offers an illustrative
example of how fear of reprimand changes attorney behavior. Even the threat
of an adjudicated Batson violation, however uncommon in practice, can lead
federal prosecutors to modify their approaches to evaluating and dismissing
prospective jurors.49 This is because prosecutors are often more concerned
about how their decisions might affect the perception of their motivations
and biases than they are about the actual likelihood of professional
repercussions in the form of a Batson violation.50 This empirical reality may
stem from the fact that lawyers perceive violations of antidiscrimination law
governing jury selection as embarrassing or contrary to their professional
duties.51 To this end, lawyers frequently work to manage colleagues’,
judges’, and adversaries’ impressions of themselves, especially when they
are repeat players.52 If a judge was to perceive a prosecutor’s behavior as
shameful, for example, then judges may view the entire district attorney’s
office in a negative light.53 And if colleagues perceive behavior as
counterproductive or antithetical to collaborative work, it can precipitate
adverse employment consequences, including forgone case assignments,
promotions, additional work product review, or transfer to different units.
B. Creating Norms and Expectations
Model ethics rules also articulate the normative expectations of the legal
community to the practitioners who join its ranks.54 Law and psychology
scholar Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, for example, has argued that ethics rules have

significant impact on the implementation of professional rules and other legal constraints on
lawyer behavior.”).
48. See generally Anna Offit, Race-Conscious Jury Selection, 82 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3587892 [https://
perma.cc/SL38-ZHRJ].
49. See Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers
Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 370 (2005).
50. Offit, supra note 48 (manuscript at 47).
51. Id. (manuscript at 58–59) (“Beyond instrumental concern about the possibility of later
appeal, the negative valence of racism and sexism in American society at-large, coupled with
public scrutiny of exclusion at the hands of prosecutors, heightened Assistant U.S. Attorney’s
desire to avoid patterns of professional behavior indicative of animus toward particular
groups.”).
52. Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences on
Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT
269, 278 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (“In some jurisdictions, opposing
counsel tend to see each other frequently, and they understand that conflicts have high costs
in compromising their ability to negotiate guilty pleas and achieve other efficiencies.”).
53. Id. (“In particular, individual prosecutors or their offices as a whole may respond to
how other local actors and agencies regard their behavior, preferring others to regard their
behavior as legitimate and consistent with established practices and conventions.”).
54. See generally Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
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an expressive function that precipitates changes in social norms.55
Unsurprisingly, the attachment of criminal punishment to certain conduct can
prompt critique or condemnation by others.56 As a result, and even in the
absence of enforcement, the existence of rules can reduce the prevalence of
socially undesirable behavior.57 In a similar vein, legal ethics scholar W.
Bradley Wendel has argued that lapses in professional judgment often result
from failures of “internalized standards of professional conduct” that
attorneys reinforce through the “monitoring and criticism” of fellow
lawyers.58 In the context of the criminal justice system, Wendel argues that
this sort of informal monitoring and surveillance advances notions of “honor”
that balance “the opposing obligations to be a zealous advocate for the
interests of one’s client, as well as an officer of the court.”59
Wendel also suggests that the Model Rules can regulate behavior
informally. This includes sanctioning in the form of being the subject of
gossip by colleagues or opposing counsel.60 Informal behavioral regulation
can also take the form of lawyers responding to unethical behavior by
becoming uncooperative in scheduling and administrative matters, practicing
“by the book” so as to increase expenses and other adverse effects on clients
and judges, or excluding unethical lawyers from referral networks.61 In this
manner, informal forms of ethical regulation among legal actors who work
with each other regularly can become as, if not more, influential than formal
legal sanctions.
Law and society scholars have also discussed the fluid relationship
between legal sanctions and informal norms of conduct. Stewart Macaulay’s
influential study of “exchange relationships,”62 for example, observed the
extent to which businesses treated purchase agreements as contracts despite
the fact that such agreements did not meaningfully plan for contingencies and
could not be used to induce performance.63 Macaulay noticed, in particular,
that businesses felt greater motivation to comply with agreements out of an
interest in maintaining strong and enduring relationships than because of the
threat of potential litigation.64 Likewise, Lisa Bernstein, who studied
nonlegal regulation in the cotton industry, noted that “a transactor’s sense of
self-esteem, his position in the community, and his social connections were
55. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1538–
39 (2000).
56. Id. at 1544 (“Criminalizing undesirable conduct to support a social norm can
embolden people to levy informal sanctions against a violator and signal potential violators
that their conduct will draw a severe social sanction.”).
57. Id.
58. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 19–20 (3d ed.
1999).
59. Wendel, supra note 43, at 1570.
60. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in
Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1953, 1969 (2001).
61. Id. at 1959–60.
62. Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOCIO. REV. 55, 56 (1963).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 63.
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intertwined with his business reputation.”65 Breach of contract could thus
harm one’s social, as well as professional, well-being.66
It is precisely these types of extralegal concerns that make lawyers
sensitive to informal sanctions, including gossip or “war stories” that might
lead others to view them as uncooperative, aggressive, or untrustworthy.67
Although reputational self-consciousness can be useful in regulating
behavior in repeat interactions, it may be less effective in influencing one-off
interactions in which lawyers know they are unlikely to encounter each other
in the future.68 Still, even the possibility or threat of destructive gossip can
serve to deter unethical behavior69—with ethics rules supplying normative
force for such self-consciousness. This threat is only more acutely felt at a
time when allegations of wrongdoing can circulate publicly and
instantaneously through social media.70
In the criminal context, empirical research by Ellen Yaroshefsky and
Bruce A. Green has shed light on the roles these considerations can play in
the everyday decision-making of prosecutors. They observed that one of the
greatest influences on prosecutorial conduct was informal peer pressure.71 In
particular, they found that prosecutors’ conduct was shaped by their
preference for having others “regard their behavior as legitimate and
consistent with established practices and conventions.”72 This heightened
self-awareness on the part of prosecutors is only amplified by the fact that
they often work with the same judges or defense attorneys; prosecutors have
a stake in establishing and maintaining good reputations, as they rely on the
good will of the courts and public defenders’ offices for the smooth
management of their work.73 Even an informal expression of frustration or
disapproval from a judge can jeopardize this productive and advantageous
rapport.74 Other studies have corroborated this insight into the social
65. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1749 (2001).
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also Wendel, supra note 43, at 1599 (“Judges often rely on the reputation of
counsel or the history of dealing with one of the lawyers when making discretionary
judgments. If one lawyer has appeared uncooperative, the judge may rule against her in a
discovery dispute, even though the judge would have been inclined to grant a different lawyer
a break.”).
68. Wendel, supra note 43, at 1605.
69. Id.
70. Catie Edmondson, Former Clerk Alleges Sexual Harassment by Appellate Judge,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/judgereinhardt-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/LV46-PVPG].
71. Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 52, at 277–78.
72. Id. at 278; see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal
Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 449–50 (2002) (“However much (or little) we
enforce professional regulation, we have to acknowledge that courts and disciplinary agencies
never will become familiar with most activities in which prosecutors engage. We inevitably
rely heavily on prosecutorial self-regulation and self-enforcement. . . . [R]ightly or wrongly,
the perception of independence contributes to federal prosecutors’ sense of self-worth.”
(footnote omitted)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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dynamics of the courtroom work group, including relationships among
prosecutors, public defenders, and judges.75
The impact of formal ethics rules—and informal ethics norms—on
prosecutorial behavior and decision-making is especially important in the
context of jury selection, discussed in the next part. This is because
prosecutorial misconduct, discrimination, and abuses of discretion have been
a central focus of those attuned to the pervasive problem of race-based jury
exclusion and systemic racism in the legal system more broadly.76
III. APPLICATIONS OF MODEL RULE 8.4(G) TO DISCRIMINATION DURING
JURY SELECTION
As a matter of both practice and scholarly focus, jury selection has long
been considered a locus of race-based discrimination in the legal system.77
Of particular concern is the extent to which lawyers can use peremptory
challenges to strike otherwise eligible jurors of color with impunity.78
Although the Batson doctrine ostensibly forbids the racial exclusion of
prospective jurors,79 attorneys can easily circumvent the law by offering
race-neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes they exercise, if
challenged.80 Among the limitations of Batson, scholars have highlighted
the doctrine’s emphasis on discerning racial animus on the part of attorneys
accused of dismissing jurors based on race.81 This has prompted concern
75. See, e.g., Marc G. Gertz, The Impact of Prosecutor/Public Defender Interaction on
Sentencing: An Exploratory Typology, 5 CRIM. JUST. REV. 43 (1980); Don Stemen & Bruce
Frederick, Rules, Resources, and Relationships: Contextual Constraints on Prosecutorial
Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (2013).
76. See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
77. See, e.g., Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The
Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina
Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012) (finding that prosecutors in capital prosecutions
were 2.5 times more likely to strike otherwise eligible Black prospective jurors from venires
than white jurors); Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest
Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 414 (2017) (examining the extent to
which lawyers’ exercise of peremptory challenges based on citizens’ arrest records lead to the
disproportionate exclusion of Black and Latinx prospective jurors); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Batson from the Very Bottom of the Well: Critical Race Theory and the Supreme Court’s
Peremptory Challenge Jurisprudence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71 (2014) (acknowledging the
centrality of race to prosecutors’ approaches to jury selection and outlining the extent to which
Batson and its progeny have failed to address the continuing problem of race-based jury
exclusion); Anna Offit, Benevolent Exclusion, 96 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3724467
[https://perma.cc/CYY3GXX8] (examining the role that the challenge dismissals of jurors “for cause” plays in
facilitating forms of socioeconomic exclusion that perpetuate racial disparities on juries).
78. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585 (2012).
79. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
80. See generally EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY (2010), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racialdiscrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/L865-6TDZ].
81. See, e.g., Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter
Failure to Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501,
505 (“Any trial attorney with the wherewithal to refrain from using gender or race words in
the explanation and the discipline to avoid accepting a juror to whom the exact same ‘neutral
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that the law’s focus on expressions of explicit racial bias on the part of
attorneys has come at the expense of attention to more routinized forms of
prejudice that pervade peremptory82 and cause challenges83 alike.
A. The Amended Rule’s Inclusion of an Objective Mens Rea Standard
Concern about the impact of attorney bias on jury demographics has
catalyzed state-level reform aimed at helping lawyers challenge—and
remedy—the discriminatory excusal of prospective jurors. One decisive step
toward enhancing the use and effectiveness of the Batson doctrine was
implemented by the Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Jefferson.84
In this attempted murder case, prosecutors used their last peremptory strike
to dismiss the last remaining Black prospective juror from the venire.85 Yet
when defense counsel challenged the move, the trial court found, under the
third step of the Batson test, that the “race-neutral” reasons the state advanced
for its strike did not reflect purposeful discrimination on the part of the
challenged lawyer, as the law required.86
The Washington State Supreme Court reversed the conviction on appeal,
citing numerous procedural and practical limitations of the Batson doctrine.87
In an effort to modify Batson to address its shortcomings,88 the court adopted
a new framework for challenging discriminatory peremptory challenges:
General Rule 37 (GR 37).89 Among the innovations of the new rule was its
departure from the racial animus requirement that for so long required judges
to adjudicate Batson violations perpetrated only by explicitly biased
lawyers.90 Instead, GR 37 substitutes judges’ subjective assessments of how
to draw the line between deliberate and unintentional discrimination with
consideration of how an “objective observer could view race or ethnicity as
a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge” during the adjudication of a
Batson challenge.91 GR 37 requires, further, that judges imagine this

explanation’ would apply has beaten what one court calls the Batson ‘charade.’” (quoting
People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996))).
82. See, e.g., Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 209 (2005) (“The automatic use of these
stereotypes is not necessarily related to whether the decision-maker consciously agrees or
disagrees with the particular stereotype.”); see also Offit, supra note 77.
83. See generally Offit, supra note 77.
84. 429 P.3d 467 (Wash. 2018).
85. Id. at 471. The stated rationale for exercising a peremptory strike to remove the
prospective juror was the juror’s perception that jury service was a waste of time, his
familiarity with the film 12 Angry Men, and his characterization of his deliberations in a case
during jury service in the past. Id.
86. Id. at 472.
87. See id. at 476; see also City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1131 (Wash. 2017);
State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 334–36 (Wash. 2013).
88. See Annie Sloan, Note, “What to Do About Batson?”: Using a Court Rule to Address
Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 233, 242 (2020).
89. See Jefferson, 429 P.3d at 477.
90. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
91. WASH. STATE CT. GEN. R. 37.
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objective viewer as a person in possession of sophisticated knowledge of
institutional and subconscious racism.92
The development of Model Rule 8.4(g) reflects similar recognition of the
critical need for a more expansive approach to the mens rea of attorneys
engaged in discriminatory behavior during trial. Prior to its incorporation
into the rule, the text of subsection (g) stated that a lawyer in violation of the
rule must “knowingly manifest[]” discriminatory action93—a condition that
changed to “knowingly” or “reasonably should know.”94
This significant development was the product of deliberation and
compromise. When the ABA first proposed the new rule in 2015, it invited
feedback on the specific question of whether the rule should include a mens
rea.95 Following this, the proposed draft that was circulated in August 2016
eliminated a knowledge (or other mens rea) requirement for the rule
altogether, such that the rule read, in pertinent part: “It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (g) harass or discriminate on the basis of
race, sex, religion . . . .”96 The committee ultimately submitted a revised
report with a knowledge requirement specified in the rule,97 after some
argued that in the absence of a mens rea requirement, the rule could be
viewed as a quasi-criminal rule of absolute liability.98
Much like the Washington State Supreme Court’s objective mens rea
standard pertaining to juror discrimination, ABA Revised Resolution 109
recognized, in explicit terms, that the inclusion of both a subjective and
objective mens rea would “safeguard against evasive defenses of conduct that
any reasonable lawyer would have known is harassment or discrimination.”99
And the “reasonably should have known” standard was defined as
“denot[ing] ‘that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would
ascertain the matter in question.’”100

92. See id. r. 37(f) (“Nature of Observer. For purposes of this rule, an objective observer
is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to purposeful
discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.”).
GR 37 was the product of the collaborative labor of a work group convened by the Washington
State Supreme Court, drawing on input from the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys. See JURY SELECTION WORKGROUP,
PROPOSED NEW GR 37:
FINAL REPORT (2018), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/
publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/OrderNo25700-A-1221Workgroup.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VQM6-B4S8].
93. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1998) (amended
2016).
94. Id. r. 8.4(g).
95. See id. r. 8.4 (Discussion Draft 2015).
96. AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION AND REPORT 1–2 (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/scepr_report_to_hod_rule_8_4_a
mendments_05_31_2016_resolution_and_report_posting.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MQ4-WQKA].
97. See AM BAR ASS’N, supra note 7.
98. Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide for
State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 217 (2017).
99. AM BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 8.
100. Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(j)).
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Despite the similar inclusion of an objective mens rea standard, Model
Rule 8.4(g) stopped short of permitting a single discriminatory peremptory
challenge to rise to the level of an ethics rule violation.101 Instead, this part
of the comment proposes the rule be interpreted as a less stringent check on
illegal jury exclusion than Batson, which dispensed with prior case law
holding that racial jury exclusion in a single trial would not violate
antidiscrimination law.102 A more effective and expansive approach to the
ethical regulation of jury exclusion would acknowledge the harm of illegally
excluding even a single juror103 by specifying that one discriminatory
peremptory challenge should create a rebuttable presumption that Model
Rule 8.4(g) has been violated.104
Despite its shortcomings, it is notable that Comment 5 to Model Rule
8.4(g) explicitly references jury selection as a context in which attorneys can
be subject to ethical regulation, even though this remains untested.105 In
light of this significant acknowledgment, the rule may complement and
enhance Batson challenges as a secondary means of identifying and
remediating forms of jury exclusion that deprive citizens of their right to
participate in the legal system. As discussed in Part II, even the possibility
of an ethics violation can encourage greater vigilance, care, and
consciousness of Batson on the part of attorneys engaged in routine
assessments of prospective jurors.
B. Distinguishing Illegal Discrimination from “Legitimate Advocacy”
Model Rule 8.4(g) concludes with a significant, though ambiguous, carveout for “legitimate advice or advocacy.”106 This language was not entirely
new for the rule; under previous Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4(d), the ABA
stated that a
lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by
words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national
101. Id. at 2 (noting that a “trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised
on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of” subsection (g)).
102. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) (“This Court has held that the
fairness of trial by jury requires no less. Hence veniremen are not always judged solely as
individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges. Rather they are challenged
in light of the limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may include their group
affiliations, in the context of the case to be tried. With these considerations in mind, we cannot
hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws.”
(citation and footnote omitted)).
103. The U.S. Supreme Court interprets Batson as holding that the discriminatory removal
of a single prospective juror is a constitutional violation. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.
Ct. 2228, 2248 (2019) (noting that “the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective
juror for a discriminatory purpose” (citing Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016)));
see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008).
104. I thank Adam M. Gershowitz for suggesting this proposed modification of the
language of Comment 5. See also Lonnie T. Brown Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury
Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 310–11
(2003).
105. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
106. See id. r. 8.4(g).
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origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates
paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not
violate paragraph (d). A trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges
were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a
violation of this rule.107

Under both the old comment and the new rule, an exception for “legitimate
advocacy” thus remains intact.108
Scholars and practitioners seeking clarity on this point, however, will be
disappointed, as the rule fails to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate
advocacy.109 There was in fact no definition provided upon the term’s
incorporation into the comment.110 Some have argued that the phrase should
be understood as a moral commentary on the ends sought through advocacy,
while others have focused on legal process.111 Yet under any definition, it
remains unclear whether bias and discrimination are ever defensible parts of
legal practice.112 The issue becomes particularly murky in the context of jury
selection, where some have argued that bias and zealous advocacy go hand
in hand.113 The line between permissible and illegal jury exclusion is
particularly difficult to regulate when uncontested peremptory challenges can
be exercised without transparency on the part of the lawyers who use them.114
This conundrum led one of the drafters of Model Rule 8.4(g) to acknowledge
the fact that “race, gender, and other factors are sometimes legitimate
subjects of consideration” and that discussion of such attributes during voir
dire should not necessarily run afoul of the rule.115
The rule is clear that a single Batson violation will not trigger an ethics
violation. In writing about the previous iteration of the rule, one scholar has
argued that the placement of the reference to a peremptory challenge after its
reference to legitimate advocacy (in Comment 2) suggests that it was not the
intent of the rule drafters for Batson violations to automatically precipitate
ethics violations.116 A more probable interpretation, however, is one that the
same author concludes with: though a single Batson violation may not in
itself rise to the level of an ethics violation, a Batson violation alongside other
107. Id. r. 8.4(d) cmt. 3 (amended 2016).
108. Interestingly, though the drafters of Model Rule 8.4(g) in 2016 initially chose not to
include a legitimate advocacy provision in the rule, they reversed course soon after. See
Michael William Fires, Note, Regulating Conduct: A Model Rule Against Discrimination and
the Importance of Legitimate Advocacy, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 735, 746 (2017).
109. See id. at 741.
110. Id.
111. See Note, Discriminatory Lawyers in a Discriminatory Bar: Rule 8.4(g) of the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 773, 786 (2017).
112. Comment, Batson v. Kentucky and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Is
a Violation of Batson Also an Ethical Violation?, 29 J. LEGAL PRO. 205, 210 (2005).
113. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, “Nice Work If You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury Selection in
Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 528–30 (1998) (defending the ability for defense
attorneys to strike or empanel prospective jurors based on race).
114. See EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 80, at 47.
115. Fires, supra note 108, at 742.
116. See Comment, supra note 112, at 210–11.
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“biased conduct or some other aggravating factor” may rise to the level of an
ethics violation.117
In contrast to Model Rule 8.4(g)’s open-ended reference to legitimate
advocacy, modifications of the Batson doctrine, including Washington
State’s GR 37, have sought to add greater specificity to impermissible juror
discrimination. Washington’s rule, for instance, designates particular bases
for peremptory challenges presumptively invalid to the extent that they have
historically encompassed protected groups, including those who have past
contact with law enforcement officers or who distrust the police.118
Reference to aspects of a juror’s demeanor, such as her “inattentive[ness]” is
also regarded by the rule as having “historically been associated with
improper discrimination.”119 As an ethics rule extending to misconduct
beyond jury exclusion, it is hardly surprising that Model Rule 8.4(g)’s
regulation of discriminatory forms of juror assessment leaves the Batson
doctrine, and a judge’s discretion to enforce it, unaltered. Yet, the revision
of the rule to incorporate an objective mens rea standard, combined with the
ability of even underenforced antidiscrimination rules to modify conduct
discussed in Part I, holds promise for the rule’s continued adoption and more
expansive application.
CONCLUSION
Jury selection proceedings, among other sites of racial exclusion in the
U.S. legal system, remind us of the vital importance of ethics rules as both a
moral compass and practical deterrent for reputation-conscious practitioners.
In its newly revised form, which includes an objective mens rea standard and
explicit reference to Batson violations as a trigger for ethical scrutiny, Model
Rule 8.4(g) should be applied to the task of further democratizing juries. To
the extent that the threat (if not reality) of an adjudicated Batson violation
already prompts lawyers to modify their assessments of jurors during the
peremptory challenge phase of voir dire, as discussed in Part II, the explicit
threat of an ethics violation can only enhance antidiscrimination law’s
potential.

117. Id. at 210.
118. See WASH. STATE CT. GEN. R. 37.
119. Id.

